Week 8: Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Jay Daigle

Occidental College

October 17, 2019

Jay Daigle (Occidental College)

Elliptic Curves Cryptography


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
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 $E: y^2 = x^3 + 3x + 8$ over \mathbb{F}_{13}

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$$1^2 \equiv 1$$
 $2^2 \equiv 4$ $3^3 \equiv 9$ $4^3 \equiv 3$ $5^2 \equiv 12$ $6^2 \equiv 10$
 $7^2 = 10$ $8^2 = 12$ $9^2 = 3$ $10^2 = 9$ $11^2 = 4$ $12^2 = 1$

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + 3x + 8$$
 over \mathbb{F}_{13}

 $E(\mathbb{F}_{13}) = \{\mathcal{O}, (1,5), (1,8), (2,3), (2,10), (9,6), (9,7), (12,2), (12,11)\}.$


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
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The line y = 5x over \mathbb{F}_{13}

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
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$$y^2 = x^3 + 3x + 8$$
 and $y = 5x$

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Let $E: y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B$ be an elliptic curve over \mathbb{Q} , and let $P = (x_1, y_1)$ and $Q = (x_2, y_2)$ be points on $E(\mathbb{Q})$. Then:

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- If $y_1 \equiv -y_2 \mod p$ then $P \oplus Q = \mathcal{O}$.
- 2 If $P_1 = P_2$, then define $\lambda = \frac{3x_1^2 + A}{2y_1}$. Set

$$x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$$
 $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1.$

Then $P \oplus Q = (x_3, y_3)$.

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
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Definition

The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem: find $n \in$ such that Q = nP.

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- Compute $2^k P$ for $2^k \le a$. That is, compute $g, g^2, g^4, g^8, \ldots, g^{2^k}$.
- **2** Now express *n* in binary. That is, write $n = c_0 + c_1 \cdot 2 + c_2 \cdot 2^2 + \cdots + c_k 2^k$, where $c_i \in \{0, 1\}$.

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- Ow we can compute

$$nP = (c_0 + c_1 \cdot 2 + c_2 \cdot 2^2 + \cdots + c_k 2^k)P = c_0P \oplus c_12P \oplus c_24P \oplus \cdots \oplus c_k 2^k$$

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- Now Alice computes $n_A Q_B$ and Bob computes $n_B Q_A$.

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Alice generates a key:

- Ochoose a large prime number p, an elliptic curve E over p, and a point P ∈ E(p) of large order.
- 2 Alice chooses a private key n_A .
- 3 Alice computes and publishes a public key $Q_A = n_A P \in E(p)$.

Bob sends a message $M \in E(p)$:

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Bob sends a message $M \in E(p)$:

- **1** Bob generates a random ephemeral key k.
- ② Bob computes $C_1 = kP \in E(p)$, $C_2 = M + kQ_A \in E(p)$. Bob transmits the pair of points (C_1, C_2) to Alice.

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Alice generates a key:

- Choose a large prime number p, an elliptic curve E over p, and a point $P \in E(p)$ of large order.
- 2 Alice chooses a private key n_A .
- 3 Alice computes and publishes a public key $Q_A = n_A P \in E(n)$.

Bob sends a message $M \in E(p)$:

- Bob generates a random ephemeral key k.
- Bob computes $C_1 = kP \in E(p), C_2 = M + kQ_A \in E(p)$. Bob 2 transmits the pair of points (C_1, C_2) to Alice.

Alice decrypts the message using her private key n_A :

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- 2 Alice chooses a private key n_A .
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Bob sends a message $M \in E(p)$:

- **1** Bob generates a random ephemeral key k.
- Bob computes C₁ = kP ∈ E(_p), C₂ = M + kQ_A ∈ E(_p). Bob transmits the pair of points (C₁, C₂) to Alice.

Alice decrypts the message using her private key n_A :

• Alice computes
$$C_2 - n_A C_1 \in E(p)$$
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Key lengths for equivalent security

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Symmetric Key Size	RSA Key Size	ECC Key Size
80	1024	160
112	2048	224
128	3072	256
192	7680	384
256	15360	521

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