

$$g^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

$g$  a PR, if

$$g^x \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p} \text{ for}$$

$$x < p-1$$

$$g^{\phi(m)} \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$$

$$\bullet \phi(p) = p-1$$

$$\bullet \phi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

Order of  $a \pmod{m}$  is  
smallest pos integer  $s$  s.t.

$$a^s \equiv 1 \pmod{m}.$$

$$\text{ord}_m a.$$

$$1 \leq \text{ord}_m a \leq \phi(m)$$

$g$  is a PR mod  $p$

$$\text{iff } \text{ord}_p g = p-1.$$

Fact:  $a^r \equiv a^s \pmod{m}$

$$\text{iff } r \equiv s \pmod{\text{ord}_m(a)}.$$

$$\text{Pfl } a^r \equiv a^s \Leftrightarrow a^{r-s} \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \text{ord}_m a \mid r-s$$

$$a^{3k} \equiv (a^3)^k \equiv 1, k \equiv 1$$

$$a^5 \equiv a^3 \cdot a^2 \equiv a^2$$

$$a^r \equiv a^s \pmod{p}$$

$$\text{if } r \equiv s \pmod{p-1}$$

Public key cryptography.

Trapdoor function

a fn  $f$  easy to compute  
hard to invert,  
unless you have some extra  
'trapdoor' information.

Public key encryption alg

- key gen algorithm  
produces  
public key  $k_{pub}$   
private key  $k_{priv}$

- encryption algorithm  
 $e_{k_{pub}}: \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$

- decryption alg  
 $d_{k_{priv}}: \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$

# El Gamal (1985)

## Algorithm

1) Choose large prime  $p$

$g \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$  s.t.  
 $\text{ord}_p(g)$  is a large prime.

2) Alice chooses  
secret  $a$   
as  $k_{\text{priv}}$

3) Alice computes

$$A \equiv g^a \pmod{p}$$

publishes

$$A = k_{\text{pub}}$$

Bob wants to send  
Alice a #  $2 < m < p$

• Bob generates random  
 $k \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$   
ephemeral key

$$C_1 \equiv g^k \pmod{p}$$

$$C_2 \equiv m A^k \pmod{p}$$

• Bob sends  $(C_1, C_2)$ .

Alice computes

1) Alice computes

$$x \equiv C_1^a \pmod{p}$$

then computes  $x^{-1} \pmod{p}$

$$2) C_2 x^{-1} \equiv m \pmod{p}.$$

Pf/

$$x \equiv C_1^a \equiv (g^k)^a \equiv (g^a)^k = A^k,$$

$$\text{so } x^{-1} \equiv A^{-k}$$

$$\text{so } C_2 x^{-1} \equiv m A^k A^{-k} \equiv m \pmod{p}.$$

$$m \approx \log(p) \text{ bits}$$

$$(C_1, C_2) \approx 2 \log(p)$$

Usually  $p = 2q + 1$

where  $q$  is prime

pick  $g$  s.t.  $g^q \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$

b/c  $\phi(p) = 2q$

has factors  $1, 2, q, 2q$

so if  $g^2 \not\equiv 1$  then  
ord  $\geq q$ .

This defeats an attack

based on Quadratic

Reciprocity.

Ex:  $p = 467, g = 4$

Alice chooses  $a = 155$

$$A \equiv g^a = 4^{155} \equiv 43 \pmod{467}$$

Alice publishes: A

Bob wants to send  $m = 42$ .

chooses  $k = 187$ . compute

$$C_1 \equiv g^k = 4^{187} \equiv 456 \pmod{467}$$

$$C_2 = m A^k = 42 \cdot 43^{187} \equiv 67 \pmod{467}$$

Transmits  $(456, 67)$

$$X = C_1^a = 456^{155} \equiv 413 \pmod{467}$$

$$X^{-1} \equiv C_1^{p-1-a} = 147 \pmod{467}$$

$$m \equiv C_2 X^{-1} = 67 \cdot 147 \equiv 9849 \equiv 42 \pmod{467}$$

# Cryptanalysis

Claim: ElGamal

is at least as hard as D-H.

Imagine Eve has an

ElGamal oracle.

finds plaintext from  
ciphertext.

Then Eve can break  
D-H in poly time.

Eve overhears Alice's  $A \equiv g^a \pmod{p}$

Bob's  $B \equiv g^b \pmod{p}$ .

wants  $g^{ab} \pmod{p}$ .

Eve chooses random  $c_2$

feeds oracle: public key is  $A$

ciphertext is  $(B, c_2)$

oracle gives us

$$m \equiv (c_1^a)^{-1} c_2 \equiv (B^a)^{-1} c_2$$

$$\equiv (g^{ab})^{-1} c_2 \pmod{p}$$

$$m^{-1} c_2 \equiv g^{ab} \pmod{p}$$

# Complexity

Bob has 2 exponentiations

$O(\log(p))$  multiplications

Alice: 1 exponentiation

$O(\log(p))$  multiplications

The message expansion

doubles Bob's work

doubles bandwidth

So often use a

hybrid setup.

Use EC to transmit

asymmetric key.

# RSA Encryption

published by Rivest, Shamir, Adleman 1978

discovered by Clifford Cooks 1973  
published in 1997

Algorithm: Alice wants to send  
a message to Bob

Keygen

1) Bob chooses two primes  $p, q$

computes  $N = pq$

$$M = (p-1)(q-1)$$

2) choose number  $e$  s.t.  $\gcd(e, M) = 1$ .

3) publishes  $K_{pub} = (N, e)$

4) computes  $e^{-1} \pmod{M}$ , calls that  $d$ .  
 $K_{priv} = (M, d)$ .

Alice wants to send  $m$ ,  $1 \leq m \leq N$

1) compute  $c \equiv m^e \pmod{N}$   
transmits that.

Bob

computes  $c^d \pmod{N}$ .

$$c^d \equiv m \pmod{N}$$

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PF / recall  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{M}$

$$M = (p-1)(q-1) = \phi(N)$$

$$a^{ed} = a^{rM+1} = (a^M)^r \cdot a \equiv 1^r \cdot a \pmod{N}$$

$$c^d \equiv (m^e)^d = m^{ed} \equiv m' \equiv m \pmod{N}$$

Ex: Bob chooses  $p=73$   
 $q=89$

$$N = pq = 6497$$

$$M = 72 \cdot 88 = 6336$$

Chooses  $e=83$

computes  $d \equiv e^{-1} \equiv 6107 \pmod{6336}$

$$K_{\text{pub}} = (N, e) = (6497, 83)$$

$$K_{\text{priv}} = (M, d) = (6336, 6107)$$

Alice wants to transmit 300

$$C \equiv 300^{83} \equiv 4955 \pmod{6497}$$

Bob computes  $C^d \equiv 4955^{6107} \equiv 300 \pmod{6497}$ .