

# Evaluating Voting Methods I

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# Summary

## Voting Methods

- Plurality
- Hare's method
- Coombs's Method
- dictatorship
- monarchy
- all ties
- Copeland's Method
- Borda count
- More to come!

## Voting Method Criteria

- unanimous
- decisive
- majoritarian
- anonymous
- neutral
- monotone
- Pareto
- independent
- Condorcet
- anti-Condorcet

# Some Theorems

## Proposition

*Any social choice function that satisfies anonymity and neutrality must violate decisiveness.*

## Proposition (Taylor)

*No social choice function involving at least three candidates satisfies both independence and the Condorcet criterion.*

## Proposition

*If a method is Condorcet then it satisfies the majority criterion.*

# Analyzing the Plurality Method

## Proposition

*The plurality method is majoritarian, monotone, and Pareto, but not Condorcet, anti-Condorcet, or independent.*

## Proof.

- The majority is always a plurality, so candidate with majority will win.
- Monotone: raising a candidate on some preference lists can't reduce their first-place votes, or increase anyone else's
- Pareto: if A is ahead of B on every preference list, then B gets no votes, and can't win.

# Analyzing the Plurality Method

## Claim

*The plurality method is neither Condorcet not anti-Condorcet.*

## Proof.

2	3	2
A	B	C
C	A	A
B	C	B

- B wins plurality, but
- A beats B, A beats C, and C beats B.
- A is Condorcet, and loses
- B is anti-Condorcet, and wins



# Analyzing the Plurality Method

## Claim

*The plurality method is not independent.*

## Proof.

A	A	A	A	B	B	B
B	B	C	C	A	A	A
C	C	B	B	C	C	C

 → 

A	A	C	C	B	B	B
B	B	A	A	A	A	A
C	C	B	B	C	C	C

- First profile: A wins, B and C lose
- Second profile: B wins, A and C lose
- But relative position of A and B doesn't change.



# The Antiplurality Method

## Definition

The *antiplurality method* names as winner the candidate with the fewest last-place votes.

## Example

5	4	4	4	3
A	B	C	D	E
B	C	B	B	D
C	E	D	E	B
E	D	E	C	C
D	A	A	A	A

B, C, E all win.

5	4	4	4	3
B	C	A	D	E
C	A	B	A	A
E	B	E	B	B
D	E	D	E	D
A	D	C	C	C

B and E both win.

# The Antiplurality Method

## Definition

The *antiplurality method* names as winner the candidate with the fewest last-place votes.

## Poll Question

Which criteria does the antiplurality method satisfy?

## Proposition

*The antiplurality method is monotone, but not majoritarian, Condorcet, anti-Condorcet, Pareto, or independent.*

# The Antiplurality Method

## Proposition

*The antiplurality method is monotone, but not majoritarian, Condorcet, anti-Condorcet, Pareto, or independent.*

## Claim

*The antiplurality method is monotone.*

## Proof.

- Raising a candidate in preference lists:
  - Can't increase their last-place votes
  - Can't decrease anyone else's last-place votes.
- If a candidate wins before getting raised, they win after.



# The Antiplurality Method

## Claim

*The antiplurality method is not majoritarian, Condorcet, or anti-Condorcet.*

## Proof.

Consider the profile:

C	C	B	B	B
A	A	C	A	A
B	B	A	C	C

- What happens? A wins.
- B gets a majority but loses. Not majoritarian.
- B is the Condorcet winner. Not Condorcet.
- A is anti-Condorcet candidate. Not anti-Condorcet.



# The Antiplurality Method

## Claim

*The antiplurality method is not Pareto.*

- This is surprising!
- Just *barely* true. But true.

## Proof.

Consider the profile:

A	A	A
B	B	B
C	C	C

- What happens? A and B both win.
- Every voter prefers A to B, but B wins.
- Not Pareto.



# The Antiplurality Method

## Claim

*The antiplurality method is not independent.*

## Proof.

Consider:

C	A	A	B	B
A	B	B	A	A
B	C	C	C	C

C	A	A	B	B
A	B	B	C	C
B	C	C	A	A

- What happens?
  - A wins profile 1
  - B wins profile 2
- No voter has changed preferences between A and B.
- Not independent.



# Hare's Method

## Definition

Eliminate the candidate(s) who have the fewest first-place votes. Repeat. The last remaining candidate(s) are the winner(s).

- Popular and widely used
- Australia, New Guinea, Alaska, Maine, NYC
- Surprisingly *bad* at our criteria.

## Proposition

*Hare's method is majoritarian and Pareto, but not monotone, Condorcet, anti-Condorcet, or independent.*

# Hare's Method

## Claim

*Hare's method is majoritarian.*

## Proof.

- A majority of first-place votes will never be the fewest
- They will never be eliminated, and everyone else will.



## Claim

*Hare's method is Pareto.*

## Proof.

- If everyone prefers A to B, then B has no first-place votes
- B gets eliminated in the first round, and can't win.



# Hare's Method

## Claim

*Hare's method is not monotone.*

## Proof.

6	5	4	2
A	C	B	B
B	A	C	A
C	B	A	C

→

6	5	4	2
A	C	B	A
B	A	C	B
C	B	A	C

- Profile 1: Eliminate C, then B. A wins.
- Profile 2: Eliminate B, then A. C wins.
- Getting more votes makes A lose.



# Hare's Method

## Claim

*Hare's method is not Condorcet or anti-Condorcet.*

## Proof.

Consider:

2	3	2
A	B	C
C	A	A
B	C	B

- What happens?
  - Eliminate A and C; B wins.
- B is the anti-Condorcet candidate and wins
- A is the Condorcet candidate and loses.



# Hare's Method

## Claim

*Hare's method is not independent.*

## Proof.

2	2	1
B	A	A
A	C	B
C	B	C

→

2	2	1
B	C	A
A	A	B
C	B	C

- Profile 1: eliminate C, then B. A wins.
- Profile 2: eliminate A, then C. B wins.
- Relative preference of A and B has not changed

